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ABSTRACT 
 
 Import substitution has been marginalised from development policy discourse 
since the 1970s. This paper examines the Rwandan government’s recent attempt at 
reintroducing industrial policy with some attention devoted to ‘recapturing 
the domestic market’ – a term used to replace the ignominy associated with ‘import 
substitution.’ The paper examines two cases – cement and textiles – where such 
policies have been recently established in Rwanda. 
The paper argues that any attempt at recapturing the domestic market will 
require a strategy close to the policies of East Asian developmental states in terms of 
‘picking winners.’ However, strategically maintaining reciprocity through state-
business relationships is only part of the challenge. Though foreign investors have 
been leant on initially, actions must be put in place to develop local capitalist partners 
who may step in if foreign investors leave once incentives are reduced. This is further 
complicated by the government’s failure to develop partnerships with existing local 
capitalist partners. The Rwandan government is also constrained by a small market 
size. Any attempt at import substitution must occur in the context of accessing larger 
markets through the East African Community (EAC). This paper demonstrates that 
such regional trade agreements constitute a much greater constraint on the use of 
industrial policy than multilateral trade agreements or bilateral trade agreements with 
the United States of America or European countries (although pressure from donors 
may also contribute to reducing policy space). Such challenges showcase how the 
Rwandan government has sought to build reciprocal control mechanisms while 
attempting to access large markets through regional integration. Though the Rwandan 
government has made some progress recently, state intervention is required to 
reintroduce import substitution in the 21st century and must be balanced by the need to 
meet domestic and international political constraints. 
 
Keywords: Import substitution, Industrial Policy, Rwanda, political economy, 
textiles, cement 
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Introduction: A Brief History of Import Substitution 
 
Import substitution has had a chequered history.2 Though many attempts at 
import substitution ended in failure, history demonstrates that such policies were a 
feature of all successful late development stories. The intellectual origins of ‘infant 
industry’ arguments date back to Friedrich List (1928). List argued that Germany (and 
other latecomers) should protect infant industries to build up productive forces in the 
national economy. Such arguments, which were closely aligned with import-
substituting industrialization (ISI), also had political characteristics and were closely 
associated with a desire for self-sufficiency and independence (Schmitz 1984). 
Reinert (2007) and Chang (2002) argue that it was actually Alexander Hamilton, the 
first Treasury Secretary of the United States, who first developed the infant industry 
argument. Hamilton’s industrial project in the United States was in direct opposition 
to the work of Adam Smith (1776), who Reinert (2007) argues, was guilty of 
hypocrisy in advocating for free trade abroad while acknowledging that only nations 
with manufacturing industries could win wars. Such policies were not the preserve of 
Western countries. In the first half of the 19th century, the Ottoman Governor of 
Egypt, countered the expansion of Britain’s dominance in trade by erecting tariff 
walls and moving ahead with industrialization (Waterbury 1999). In the late 19th 
century, the Meiji government protected industries and secured the home market in its 
drive to secure structural transformation (Norman 1940, Lockwood 1968). 
 Though the case for import substitution had its critics, the Early Development 
Economics scholars (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, Lewis 1954, Singer 1950, Hirschman 
1958, Rostow 1960) generally agreed that industrialization should retain a central 
position in development policymaking.  Industrialization (and associated state 
intervention) came under heavy attack from some neoclassical economists (Bauer 
1971, Balassa 1982, Krueger 1974, Lal 1985). Critics argued that such policies had 
been associated with wasteful outcomes, created price distortions and resulted in 
unproductive rent-seeking. The World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
highlighted the sources of the problematic industrial pattern on the continent as 
government intervention, which distorted markets and encouraged ISI encouraging 
ISI at the expense of agriculture (Stein 1992). Protectionist policies had been the norm 
                                                        
2 See Bruton (1998) for a review of the literature on import substitution. 
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across many African countries.  In the 1970s, Kenya had an increasing reliance on 
import controls, Sudan extensively used quotas and tariffs and Nigeria and Ghana 
were “on the high end of the scale in terms of the number of good covered by 
quantitative restrictions” (Bienen 1990, 713). Such arguments provided the scholarly 
legitimacy for the structural adjustment policies that were forced on developing 
countries around the world in the 1970s and 1980s. Added to this, most African 
governments adopted structural adjustment programmes when their economies were 
weakened by fiscal crises or trade deficits. Several countries went through many 
rounds of structural adjustment programmes before reducing tariffs. Ghana made the 
move to low and uniform tariffs in around five years, “which was too rapid for the 
industrial sector to adjust properly and which yielded disappointing results in terms of 
growth and competitiveness” (Lall 1995, 2027). In Cote d’Ivoire, a 40 per cent 
reduction in tariffs led to the collapse of the chemical, textile, shoe and automotive 
assembly industries with local companies unable to compete against foreign imports 
(Stein 1992).3 
Boone (1994) argues that trade liberalization was designed to change the 
nature of government-business relations by depoliticizing commerce. Instead, 
outcomes in the two countries she studied (Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire) signaled little 
improvement in the strength of productive capital in these countries and the “enduring 
significance of ‘the sphere of circulation’ as a site of both private and public 
accumulation” (Boone 1994, 463). Liberalization did little to support the creation of 
domestic capitalist classes and had other adverse consequences.  Across the continent, 
it has led to the dismantling of existing industrial capitalist sectors. Some (Stein 1992) 
warned of such outcomes in the 1990s and others (Page 2012, Rodrik 2016) have 
provided evidence that this has indeed occurred. 
The dominance of New Institutional Economics (NIE) in the 1990s was 
associated with the World Bank (1997) proposing reconsidering the role of the state in 
development thinking. However, such arguments did not play out as promised. 
Instead, the state was only brought back in to develop the right institutions to support 
                                                        
3 Today, for the most part, African governments are self-disciplined into operating within the 
confines of international trade norms. In most African countries, applied tariffs are far below 
bound tariffs (Khan 2007). Since most African countries have liberalized financial sectors, 
this reduces their capacity “to take advantage of the WTO’s permissive rules on subsidizing 
science and technology by placing limits on taxation and public spending” (Shadlen 2005, 
758). 
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free markets. There was no place for industrial policy in NIE’s Good Governance 
paradigm. In fact, industrial policy has remained marginalized from development 
policy discourse since the heydays of Early Development Economics (Rodrik 2008). 
It has reappeared recently in the form of Justin Lin’s New Structural Economics 
(NSE). However, Lin is reluctant to encourage governments in developing countries 
to stray too far away from comparative advantage. This is a far cry from the 
aggressive state intervention associated with ‘picking winners’, which developmental 
state scholars (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990) argue East Asia pursued. 
 The Ethiopian government is one country that has gone against donor advice 
to implement industrial policy in recent years. Meles Zenawi’s government 
emphasized the importance of industrial policies in line with developmental states of 
the past (Oqubay 2015). More recently, there are signals that the tide is turning across 
the continent. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and 
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) have both been 
increasingly vocal about the need for aggressive industrial policies on the continent 
and focusing on the continent’s own regional markets.4 The East African Community 
(EAC) – a regional bloc comprising Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and South 
Sudan – has emphasized similar priorities, beginning with a proposed ban on second-
hand clothing to promote local textiles and garments industries. 
 This paper will examine how the Rwandan government has recently begun to 
develop industrial policies to promote its domestic manufacturing sector. It will 
examine the challenges associated with attempts to recapture the domestic market 
after almost two decades of trade liberalization. This paper will demonstrate how 
Rwanda has attempted to achieve such goals while adhering to EAC trade agreements 
and negotiating international pressures from donors and other interest groups. 
 The central argument for this paper is that for small countries like Rwanda, 
successful import substitution is likely to depend on the government’s capacity to 
develop and sustain reciprocal control mechanisms with emerging capitalists while 
abiding by bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. Related to this central 
argument, there are four sub-arguments. First, the paper follows Gerschenkron (1962) 
in arguing that the nature of late development has meant that industrialization will 
                                                        
4 UNECA has a long tradition with supporting work on industrialization, with interest sparked 
by S.J. Patel’s study of industrial growth in Africa (Ewing 1964). 
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require heavy state involvement and the trajectory of industrial transformation will be 
particular to the context and institutions in Rwanda. Thus, successful import 
substitution is likely to depend on ‘picking winners’ and retaining space to experiment 
and learn from failure in the vein of developmental state scholarship than NSE’s more 
market-friendly approach. The second sub-argument is that any protectionism for 
Rwandan-based companies must be limited by the current imperative of remaining 
open to regional competition so as to access larger markets in the future. Thus, the 
Rwandan government has made the creation of a stronger EAC a priority for its long-
term development. However, such regional engagement must be counteracted by 
strong state-business relationships to compete with regional firms in the domestic 
Rwandan markets and regional markets (EAC and also, the Congolese market). Given 
such constraints, the third sub-argument follows that for import substitution to 
succeed, the Rwandan government has to develop and sustain reciprocal control 
mechanisms with capitalist partners. Amsden (2001) argues that East Asian 
developmental states retained such mechanisms where incentives were tied to results 
and contributed to prevent wasteful rent seeking behaviour. The government must 
ensure such mechanisms are used to discipline and monitor private enterprises to 
promote learning (Khan 2000).5 Lastly, since import substitution itself is a political 
act (as is the support of backward and forward linkages) (Hirschman 1968), the 
government is constrained by having to rely on foreign investors to be lead capitalist 
partners in these strategies. To ensure the transfer of technologies, local firms must be 
supported to ensure that the benefits of such strategies are absorbed within the country 
in case foreign firms leave. Though recent attempts at industrialization in Rwanda 
should be welcomed, it is increasingly difficult for the government to find local 
capitalist partners while having to lean on foreign investors in the short-term for 
technological acquisition and local linkages development.  
 
The Marginalization of Import Substitution in the 21st Century 
 
 After World War II, Raul Prebisch was among the main advocates for import-
substitution industrialization. He (1950) argued that the prices of raw materials, which 
                                                        
5 As Amsden (1989) explored in Korea, “rents in the form of policy-induced conditional 
subsidies may be created by a developmental state” (Khan 2000, 22). 
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accounted for nearly 90 per cent of exports from developing countries, fell over time 
relative to the prices of manufactured goods. As head of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), Prebisch’s ideas provided a platform for 
import-substitution industrialization policies across the continent. Though 
neoclassical free trade theory would eventually gain more support, Prebisch’s ideas 
influenced heterodox thinkers and dependency theorists including Andre Gunder 
Frank’s (1966) theory of unequal exchange (Love 1980). Such ideas have been 
contested recently with some (Sarkar and Singer 1991) reasoning that manufacturing 
may not have enjoyed better relative prices than agriculture in recent years. Kaplinsky 
(2006) argues that China’s increasing growth and growing domestic demand for 
commodities skewed the terms-of-trade in favour of some agricultural goods. 
Meanwhile, others (Evans 2014) have argued that development has become 
increasingly ‘bit-driven’ in the 21st century and that the knowledge economy is a 
central arena for capturing surpluses today. Despite these arguments, investing in 
domestic manufacturing (which has been traditionally associated with import 
substitution) continues to have significant positive effects for late developers. The 
benefits are not just restricted to jobs. Manufacturing is traditionally perceived to be a 
‘learning centre’ in the economy (Chang 2010). The sector also organizes 
technological innovation and provides opportunities for backward and forward 
linkages, as well as diversification of the economy.  
In the 1980s, African countries had been gaining a comparative advantage in 
labour-intensive manufacturing (Jomo and Von Arnim 2011). However, trade 
liberalization prematurely exposed African infant industries to global competition 
with comparatively mature industries, precipitating deindustrialization. Trade 
liberalization in Africa occurred at a much faster pace (primarily because of pressure 
of donors) than in Asia and left no opportunities for industrial restructuring and 
diversification of the economy (Mkandawire and Soludo 1998). In the era of 
structural adjustment and the associated market-enhancing decades of reforms that 
have followed, import substitution has become nothing short of an odious word for 
development policymakers. Most within the mainstream agree that under import 
substitution, efficiency failed in the short run because imports were only produced 
and sold locally if tariff protection was undertaken. Such policies provided 
opportunities for corruption and usually led to outcomes with governments unwilling 
to withdraw subsidies from firms enjoying unproductive monopolies. It is rarely 
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acknowledged that import substitution increased output, saved foreign exchange and 
was demand-driven: “if something was imported, obviously locals were willing to pay 
for it, so the demand was there” (Amsden 2007, 12). It also provided opportunities for 
locally-owned firms to learn and access technology while enjoying government 
protection. It even led to the development of backward and forward linkages as a 
result of protection within countries rather than an increase in reliance on inputs from 
other countries. However, despite the possibilities, governments often got such 
policies wrong either willfully or due to vested interests or their limited understanding 
of the dynamics of import substitution policies.  
 Even in today’s development policymaking climate where industrial policy is 
slowly becoming ‘fashionable’, policies of the export-oriented variety have been 
favoured, with import substitution largely being perceived as old-fashioned. The 
World Bank continues to push such export-orientation today, with its reasoning 
following Say’s Law where it is assumed that supply will create its own demand 
(Ocampo and Taylor 1998). There is a false distinction between export orientation 
and import substitution though such a distinction has usually (Krueger 1985) been 
applied within the literature. Most successful ‘winners’ in manufacturing sector 
exports have developed through synergistic policies of protectionism and outward 
orientation, often occurring simultaneously. Through such policies, governments not 
only offer protection to their infant industries but also help them compete in export 
markets and gradually acquire technology through such engagement.6   
 The case for import substitution lost further significance with the increasing 
power of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the associated limitations on 
policy space in developing countries. The WTO’s demands on developing countries 
have reduced the capacity of developing countries to experiment with industrial 
policies in the way they did in the post-war years. Though some (Wade 2003) argue 
that this has made the task of accessing policy space almost impossible, others 
(Amsden and Hikino 2000; Weiss 2005) have long argued that there is still space for 
developing countries to innovate with industrial policies despite the large demands 
placed on them. Still, others (Shadlen 2005) argue that the WTO’s influence is 
exaggerated and regional or bilateral trade agreements have a much larger impact in 
                                                        
6 Zhou (2008) examines how the Chinese government used such synergistic policies to 
support local high-tech companies. 
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reducing policy space. The WTO has restricted industrial policy measures available to 
developing countries. However, there are still many policies available. Tariffs can be 
increased (although there are ceilings, which are ‘bound’), and it is still possible to 
impose import surcharges in emergency cases. Export subsidies are still used and 
though technology absorption is more expensive because of trade-related intellectual 
property rights (TRIPS), the technologies that most African countries need are too old 
to have patents (Chang 2013). However, WTO restrictions are rarely the main reason 
for the restriction of policy space in developing countries. They must also deal with 
conditionalities related to bilateral and regional trade and investment agreements, 
which can often be more restrictive (Thrasher and Gallagher 2008). Also, foreign 
donors (especially American and EU governments) and international financial 
institutions (World Bank and IMF) exert considerable pressure on the policy space for 
developing countries to use industrial policy instruments (Shadlen 2005). 
 The commodity studies literature, including literature on Global Value Chains 
(GVC), Global Production Networks (GPN) and Global Commodity Chains (GCC) 
ignores discussions of import substitution. Since commodity studies is largely 
engaged with how domestic production networks are increasingly engaged in global 
commercial circuits of trade, it does not emphasize the importance of securing the 
home market. Such an orientation within the literature is natural given its 
methodological considerations.as well as the dominance of such logic in development 
policymaking.  However, such arguments operate firmly against heterodox 
structuralist developmental state literature, which acknowledges the positive 
productive forces associated with import substitution. The commodity studies 
literature has done very little to advance an adequate theory of facilitating the state’s 
role in upgrading within value-chains and implementing industrial policies in alliance 
with firms (Cramer 1999, Bernstein and Campling 2006). There have been recent 
attempts (Smith 2015) at filling this gap but more emphasis needs to be placed on 
how the politics of relationships between governments and businesses can support 
technology acquisition and firm upgrading in developing countries. 
 Despite the marginalization of discussions of import substitution, it is 
beginning to reappear in some contexts. In Rwanda, import substitution has 
reappeared in the form of a Domestic Market Recapturing Strategy (DMRS) – a name 
that government officials and donors alike admit is not used simply to avoid using the 
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term – ‘import substitution’.7 There are at least four broad categories of constraints 
facing industrial policy. The first are those policies, which are not legally allowed as 
part of bilateral, regional or multilateral trade agreements. The second are those 
constraints that pertain to the lack of state capacity in developing countries. The third 
are to do with constraints existing because of the infeasibility of certain policy 
measures given the changes in the global economy. Lastly, the fourth are to do with 
domestic political constraints to enacting industrial policies and supporting the 
acquisition of technological capabilities in developing countries. The following 
section examines the context in which the Rwandan government began to reintroduce 
import substitution after two decades of trade liberalization and the marginalization of 
the domestic manufacturing sector. 
 
Domestic Market Recapturing in Rwanda 
 
 Since the 1994 genocide, the victorious Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) 
government has led the country through a remarkable recovery. It has experienced a 
period of ‘miracle growth’, with annual GDP growth marked at below six per cent in 
only two years since 1994 (Behuria and Goodfellow 2015). Figure 1 demonstrates 
that though agriculture has reduced as a share of GDP, the services sector has grown 
most significantly in recent years. In comparison, there has been very little 
manufacturing sector growth. Such a development trajectory is distinct from East 
Asian developmental states. In fact, at 20.4USD, real manufacturing output per capita 
in 2011 was only about half what it was in the late 1980s and it was projected that 
“Rwanda would only achieve its pre-genocide maximum of 41USD per capita around 
2025” (Gathani and Stoelinga 2013, 1). The contribution of manufacturing in the 
economy has contracted since the 2000s. In 2002, the share of manufacturing in GDP 
2014 was seven per cent. By 2014, it had dropped to 4.8 per cent (UNECA 2016). 
Figure 2 demonstrates that Rwanda’s manufacturing sector represents a lower share of 
GDP than in other East African countries. 
 
 
                                                        
7 Interviews, Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM) officials and donors, August 2016. 
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Source: World Bank 
 
 Source: World Bank 
 
Figure 3 indicates that manufacturing sector growth in Rwanda targets have 
not been achieved in most years. Targets were initially set at 12 per cent annual 
industrial growth per year in the Rwandan development strategy – VISION 2020 
(GoR 2000). However, beginning in 2011, this was later revised to 14 per cent annual 
growth per year. In 2012, the Rwandan government revised its national development 
strategy to refocus on manufacturing sector growth. In doing so, it went from purely 
targeting the creation of a ‘knowledge-based economy’ to targeting a ‘manufacturing 
and knowledge-based economy’ by 2020 (MINECOFIN 2013). One motive for the 
revision was a concern about the lack of employment opportunities in the country. 
Though officially, unemployment was estimated to be at only two per cent in 2001, 
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there was severe underemployment. One World Bank study argued that 
underemployment was 36 per cent (with 36 per cent of workers working less than 35 
hours per week but wanting to work more).  
The same study estimated that the working age population will grow at 
220,000 every year. In 2012, the government set a target of creating 200,000 jobs per 
year.  Between 2006 and 2011, the government had not met the country’s 
employment demand, creating only 126,000 jobs on average every year between 2006 
and 2011. In 2011, around 70 per cent of the working-age population was still 
employed in agriculture. Employment remained characterized by agriculture, 
informality and low earnings. The industrial sector has been a source for job creation 
between 20001 and 2014, creating 350,000 jobs. However, out of the existing 412,000 
jobs in the industrial sector, 57 per cent were employed in construction.  
 
 
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM) 
 
Figure 4 highlights the composition of industrial sector growth over the last 15 
years. Construction and agro-processing comprise the most significant shares of the 
industrial sector. Only one manufacturing sub-sector has experienced significant 
growth – beverages and tobacco. All others have contracted (UNECA 2016).8 The 
mining sector is categorized as part of the sector although its share is quite small. 
Rwanda’s exports are still largely dependent on primary commodities (coffee, tea, 
                                                        
8 This refers specifically to manufacturing sub-sectors and does not refer to construction, 
mining, agro-processing or other sectors within industry. 
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tantalum, tungsten, wolfram and pyrethrum). Since 1994, there has been some 
progress in terms of export diversification. In 2007, it was argued that Rwanda has 
achieved many small-scale new discoveries but with limited scale achieved in terms 
of those discoveries (Chandra et al. 2007). There had been significant diversification 
within primary commodities. In the 1980s, coffee comprised close to 70 per cent of 
exports in Rwanda in some years. However, minerals exports have surged in recent 
years. There has also been significant value-addition in coffee and tea sector, with 
high-quality coffee and tea now sold as packaged coffee to foreign markets. 
Collectively, traditional primary commodities (coffee, tea, minerals and pyrethrum) 
comprised around 40 per cent of exports in 2015. Manufacturing exports have 
increased more than tenfold between 2001 and 2014. Agro-processing and beverages 
are the most prominent manufacturing sector exports, with agro-processing 
recognized to be the most promising sector for the diversification of exports.9 
Bralirwa (Heineken’s subsidiary in Rwanda) is the largest firm engaging in 
manufacturing exports, as of 2010. Others included Bakhresa Grain Milling and 
Pembe flour mills, with all firms exporting to neighbouring countries (Gathani and 
Stoelinga 2012). New firms entering the sector have also begun to export new 
nontraditional exports to neighbouring countries such as the Democratic Republic of 
Congo and Burundi (Zangrandi and Mogollon 2015). Opportunities to access those 
markets, despite a lack of reliability with regards to such access, have enticed several 
new investors to Rwanda.10  However, Rwandan-based firms compete with other 
regional firms (including Ugandan firms) to access markets. Thus, there is a 
contradictory requirement of abiding by EAC rules while also developing strong 
relationships with locally-based firms to challenge regional competition. By 
embracing regional trade agreements, developing countries obtain opportunities to 
access large markets but “sacrifice the rights to use the array of industrial policies that 
countries have traditionally used to generate new productive capacity in new sectors” 
(Shadlen 2005, 769). In the Rwandan case, the government must access new markets 
while agreeing to abide by common rules and also finding ways to acquire 
technological capabilities in its local firms at a faster pace than its regional 
competitors. The task is a difficult one. It is only possible through an interventionist 
                                                        
9 Interview, MINICOM, August 2016. 
10 Interviews, foreign investors, August 2016. 
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government, which prioritizes learning and experimentation and understands the 
importance of building and sustaining reciprocal control mechanisms with local 
capitalist partners. 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) 
 
 
 There were reasons why the Rwandan government did not prioritize 
manufacturing sector growth and preferred a more service-oriented development 
strategy. Government officials argued that high transport costs, the lack of availability 
of local raw materials, inadequate and inconsistent supplies of energy and lack of 
skills and local training impeded manufacturing sector growth.11 The government 
estimated that “Rwanda’s transport costs represent as high as 40 per cent of export 
and import values”, which made the promotion of local industry expensive 
(MINICOM 2010, 12). In 2011, the import cost per container to Rwanda totaled 
$4,990, compared to $3,725 for a container for export and rated in the bottom 10 per 
cent of nations globally (MINICOM 2011). Rwanda’s position as a land-locked 
country, with access to a very small market, meant that it was unlikely that the 
government would be able to nurture firms as regional or global champions. Instead, 
President Paul Kagame chose to become a leading advocate of regional integration.  
In 2007, Rwanda became a full member of the EAC. In 2009, Rwanda joined 
the EAC Customs Union with Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi. Since July 
2009, Rwanda has applied the EAC Common External Tariff (CET). The CET uses a 
                                                        
11 Interviews, MINICOM and MINECOFIN officials, January 2015 and August 2016. 
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three-tier 0-10-25 structure, with tariff rates for imports sourced outside the EAC at 
25 per cent for finished goods, 10 per cent for intermediate goods and 0 per cent for 
raw materials and capital goods. There are no internal tariffs within the EAC except 
for sensitive items.12 During this phase, Rwanda committed to a trade policy that left 
its national firms open to regional competition in exchange for larger markets.  
By 2010, the EAC’s Customs Union was established. Prior to joining the 
customs union, in 2007, Rwanda enjoyed a positive trade balance with only one other 
EAC member, Burundi. In the same year, Rwanda’s imports from EAC members 
were four times its exports to the same countries. There were dangers to East African 
integration. History had shown that Kenya profited from the East African Common 
Market in the 1970s and expanded its industries, with Uganda and Tanzania 
complaining that their countries had subsidized Kenyan growth (Mugomba 1978). 
These factors and other political tensions led to the breakdown of the EAC in its 
earlier incarnation (Ravenhill 1979). Though domestic firms in Rwanda find it 
difficult to compete against regional competitors without protection, the government 
is convinced of the long-term benefits of East African integration and accessing larger 
markets ahead of insular protectionism of the small, domestic market. In 2014, 
Rwanda received 26.3 per cent of its total imports from within the EAC, which was 
marginally less than the proportion of imports it received from the region prior to 
joining the EAC in 2008. However, in dollar amounts, imports from the region 
increased by 1.5 times within the same period. Exports to the region increased 
manifold, with official statistics highlighting an increase from 15 million USD in 
2008 to around 320 million USD in 2014. When analyzing these statistics, it must be 
kept in mind that new figures included the exports of minerals through Tanzania, as 
well as the export of coffee and tea through Kenya. Neither Kenya nor Tanzania was 
the final destination of these goods.13 
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of trade deficit in Rwanda. Hirschman (1968) 
argued that there were four ‘motive’ forces behind Import Substitution 
Industrialization (ISI) – wars, balance-of-payments difficulties, growth of the 
                                                        
12 In 2012, Rwanda applied additional tariffs on 12 sensitive items: maize and milk products, 
wheat flower, maize, maize flour, rice, cigarettes, matches, woven fabrics, bed linen, sacks 
and bags, crown corks, and primary cells and batteries. 
13 In 2014, 86.5 per cent of exports from Rwanda and Tanzania were in the form of minerals.  
71.1 per cent of exports from Rwanda to Kenya were in the form of coffee and tea. These 
goods were eventually exported elsewhere. 
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domestic market (as a result of export growth) and official development policy. In 
Rwanda’s case, only war has not been a salient motive recently. In fact, given that 
Rwanda is often accused of supporting rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), it could be argued that an absence of war has actually accompanied the 
motives for ISI. Also, though the domestic market has grown, this is still not enough 
to entice domestic or local investors to make bets on domestic manufacturing without 
government incentives or orders. Instead, access to the regional markets and markets 
in the DRC were motives for ISI. However, the most significant motive is with regard 
to balance-of-payment difficulties. 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
Though the trade deficit has remained relatively steady, between 10 to 16 per 
cent of GDP, imports have increased substantially over that time. The Rwandan 
government has stated its intention to diversify its exports since 1994 unlike the 
previous government, which retained a preference for prioritizing coffee exports as 
part of a nation-building project (Verwimp 2003). However, when aid was 
temporarily withdrawn in 2012 after allegations that the Rwandan government was 
supporting rebel groups in the DRC, a significant shift took place within Rwanda. It 
became clear that “aid could no longer be relied on.”14 More importantly, donors 
moved towards permanently ending the budget support that the government received 
                                                        
14 Interview, MINICOM official, January 2015. 
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before 2012 and shifting to more project aid.15 Commodity prices also dropped 
substantially. This was particularly true for minerals with a leading minerals exporter 
claiming that “in 2013, he alone contributed to 20 per cent of GDP but it all changed 
when the prices of minerals crashed.”16 In 2014 and 2015, export receipts from 
minerals reduced by more than 40 per cent in comparison with 2013. Since then, the 
government has been particularly worried about its access to foreign exchange. This 
came to a head in June 2016 when the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved 
an 18-month Stand-by Credit Facility, worth 204 million USD, to support Rwanda’s 
foreign exchange reserves. In return, the Rwandan government committed to higher 
exchange rate flexibility, reducing imports and restraining fiscal policies (IMF 2016). 
In 2015, the government published its Domestic Market Recapturing Strategy 
(DMRS), which complements existing strategies including The National Industrial 
Strategy, National Export Strategy and Special Economic Zone Policy, in providing a 
platform for reinvigorating Rwanda’s domestic manufacturing sector. Several 
MINICOM officials argued that 2015 was a significant year for refocusing efforts on 
the manufacturing sector, with the President acknowledging the weak performance of 
the sector.17 The objective of the DMRS is to increase domestic production for local 
consumption while contributing to structural transformation of the productive sector 
and increasing international competitiveness (MINICOM 2015). The DMRS 
highlights three priority sectors: construction materials, light manufacturing and agro-
processing. These three priority sectors include 21 specific sectors, with selection 
based on potential contribution to import reduction, the existence of planned projects 
in the sector, the size of the domestic market and export potential to neighbouring 
countries, availability of raw material and whether projects had strong linkages to 
other domestic sectors. There was a preference for sectors, which were labour and 
capital-intensive rather than those that were land or skills-intensive. Cement, textiles 
and garments were highlighted as high-priority sectors for the DMRS, with a large 
potential for recapturing the domestic market.  
To support the DMRS, the government has launched a ‘Made in Rwanda’ 
campaign to “change the mindset” of the local population to consume locally and trust 
                                                        
15 Interviews, donors and government officials, August 2016. 
16 Interview, Foreign owner of mining company, August 2016. 
17 Interviews, MINICOM officials, August 2016. 
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in the better quality of locally-produced goods.18 As part of the strategy, the 
government has also committed to supporting local companies through its own 
procurement contracts, as well as holding fairs and investing in publicity campaigns 
for locally produced goods. The government has also established an Export Growth 
Facility (EGF), worth more than one billion Rwandan Francs. The EGF allows 
exporters to access funds at 8 per cent interest per annum up to 50 per cent of the 
costs exporters incur when seeking new markets abroad. 
Several new investors have entered the manufacturing sector in recent years. 
To support the industrial sector, the government began a Special Economic Zone 
(SEZs) programme in 2006. From the outset, there was recognition that SEZs were 
not a “panacea” (MINICOM 2010b), with the government cognizant of the mixed 
experiences with SEZs around the world (Farole 2011, Stein 2012). Such zones are 
usually created to address infrastructural deficiencies, procedural complexities and 
barriers raised by monetary, trade, fiscal, taxation, tariff and labour policies 
(Aggarwal 2006). Rwanda’s use of SEZs has not developed as per initial planning. 
Initially, there were plans to develop two separate zones: a Kigali Free Trade Zone 
and an Industrial Park. However, these projects have now merged. The SEZ now has 
two phases. The first phase was fully operationalized in 2014. All 61 plots are 
currently booked, with some existing companies relocated from the former Gikondo 
Industrial Park. The government is currently pressuring remaining factories in 
Gikondo to move to the SEZ.19 The second phase has also nearly been completed, 
with the government reporting that more than 80 per cent of plots were booked.20 
Most investments are in line with strategic DMRS targets. However, there have also 
been big bets. Positivo BGH – a joint venture between Argentinian and Brazilian 
investors – has invested in a computer components assembling factory in Kigali. Such 
investments aim to complement Rwanda’s One Laptop per Child programme. The 
plant currently has the capacity to produce 60,000 computers per month although it 
has only produced around 100,000 computers, as of May 2015. The government has a 
deal in place to buy 150,000 computers from Positivo every year. However, there 
have been some initial complaints with students arguing that the software on the 
                                                        
18 Interview, MINICOM official, August 2016. 
19 Interviews, domestic and foreign firms, August 2016. 
20 Interview, Special Economic Zones Regulatory Authority of Rwanda (SEZAR), August 
2016. 
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computers is not appropriate for their needs (Kanamugire and Afadhali 2016). For 
such large gambles to amount to anything, the government must retain disciplinary 
control and provide reciprocal benefits to investors to ensure they reinvest to adapt 
their products in line with the needs of domestic and regional markets. 
This is the context in which import substitution has assumed centre stage in 
Rwandan development policy. Since ISI was marginalized in mainstream 
development policymaking, the Rwandan government chose to avoid going against 
donor advice. The following sections demonstrate the restricted policy environment in 
which ISI strategies operate and the increased extent of state intervention that is 
required if aims to recapture the domestic market are to be realized. In both sectors, 
the government must rely on foreign investors for action while also retaining ‘zero 
tariffs’ for competitors from within the EAC. Developmental patrimonialism 
arguments (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2012, Kelsall 2013) with regard to Rwanda 
would assume that party- and military-owned actors would be used as leading firms in 
these sectors. However, this paper supports previous work (Behuria 2015, 2016) that 
shows that contestation among elites has reduced the space in which such enterprises 
operate and inevitably, this results in increased reliance on foreign actors. Though this 
may be because local capitalists lack technological capabilities in the sector, it is also 
because many domestic capitalists are either in exile or are no longer trusted by the 
RPF. Further, two decades of liberalization have made it increasingly difficult to 
incentivize local investors to take risks in sectors where importers have dominated 
market share. 
 
Made in Rwanda or China Makes in Rwanda? Recapturing the Apparels Sector 
 
 Apparel production has historically been a springboard for structural 
transformation. It is a typical starter industry for countries engaging in export-oriented 
industrialization because of its low fixed costs and associated labour-intensive 
manufacturing (Gereffi 1999). China has dominated global apparel exports in recent 
years, doubling its market share from 15.2 per cent to 33.2 per cent between 1995 and 
2008 (Gereffi and Frederick 2010). Building a national champion in the sector that 
can compete with Chinese companies is a non-starter. In particular, securing the home 
market has several benefits aside from reducing the trade deficit. Amsden (2013) 
argued that such policies allow firms to reach scale economies, build a supplier 
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network, learn to raise productivity and profit from natural protection because of 
tastes, transport costs, import duties, local supplier loyalties and government 
procurement practices. However, in Rwanda, the lead firms used in securing the home 
market in the two sectors of this study are foreign-owned. Thus, the challenge of 
building reciprocal control mechanisms with such firms and ensuring technological 
acquisition among local firms becomes even more difficult. 
 The textiles and garments sectors have never been strong contributors to 
growth through Rwandan history. Stephen Haggblade (1989) conducted a study of the 
Rwandan textiles sector in the 1980s. He found that there were four distinct ways in 
which clothing was supplied to Rwandan consumers. The first was through different 
kinds of retail shops, which imported clothing from abroad. The second included five 
medium-scale companies, employing between 10 to 100 people, which produced 
clothes for the domestic market. The third included firms, which distributed imported 
cloth to local consumers who then approached tailors to produce garments. The fourth 
included firms who imported second-hand clothing from Europe and the United 
States. Channels 3 and 4 held the majority share of the market. 
The Struggle to Build Reciprocal Control Mechanisms: UTEXRWA in Rwanda 
Until 1984, all textiles were imported in Rwanda although some cotton was 
produced domestically for some years in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1984, Kishor 
Jobanputra, who initially worked as a trader in Rwanda, established a small-scale 
firm, which initially focused on weaving and spinning but later became Rwanda’s 
first vertically integrated textile company – L’Usine Textile du Rwanda 
(UTEXRWA). In 1985, UTEXRWA began printing and dyeing imported raw cloth. 
Soon after that, UTEXRWA began to dominate the second cluster in the textiles and 
garments sector, identified by Haggblade (1989). UTEXRWA quickly became a 
‘winner’ for the Rwandan government (under President Juvenal Habyarimana) and 
profited from supplying a large share of the cloth and fabrics produced domestically.  
UTEXRWA also profited from contracts to supply uniforms for industry wear, 
schools, military and hospitals. It also developed contracts to supply garments on 
order to the DRC and enjoyed duty exempt status on its exports. These privileged 
contracts with customers in the DRC were a source of significant profits for 
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UTEXRWA. In 1993, UTEXRWA received 20 million dollars in revenues. However, 
the contract with Congolese customers was ended in 1994.21  
After 1994, UTEXRWA officials described their experience “as a struggle” since 
“there was no buying power locally.”22 During the genocide, UTEXRWA lost its 
trained workers. Parts of the factory were destroyed and raw materials warehouses 
were burned (Mukaaya 2007). In 1999, UTEXRWA received revenues worth 5.5 
million dollars but was suffering losses of over two million dollars. At the time, 
Jobanputra considered shutting the factory down. However, in 2000, UTEXRWA 
began working with the government and consultancy company – On The Frontier 
(OTF) – to diversify into the production of silk products. Gradually, the company 
recovered after receiving contracts to supply uniforms to the military, the police and 
some local industries. It also began to export products to North America during this 
time. In 2005, it targeted new customers and produced antibacterial medical fabrics 
and also supplied uniforms to hotels, schools, colleges and laboratories.  
In the late 2000s, UTEXRWA continued to face problems. It lost its contract to 
supply the military with uniforms since the military chose the cheaper option of 
importing uniforms from China. In February 2011, more than 500 UTEXRWA 
workers began industrial action, going on strike in protest of the unfair dismissal of 33 
workers, low wages, denial of annual leave and poor working conditions. After a six-
day strike, The Ministry of Public Service and Labour (MIFOTRA) ensured the 
reinstatement of 33 UTEXRWA workers (Ndoli 2011). Such difficulties meant that 
UTEXRWA was unable to re-establish itself in the domestic market. It also did not 
enjoy the privileged status it enjoyed in the late 1980s. Currently, UTEXRWA 
employs around 600 workers. Until recently, the company only focused on producing 
uniforms but because of opportunities associated with the DMRS, it has begun 
production of clothing for the local market. 
In the 2000s, UTEXRWA worked with the government to begin silk production in 
Rwanda. Silk was perceived to be a priority export since there was potential for 
locally sourcing silk inputs and Rwanda enjoyed a suitable climate for mulberry 
cultivation. Since inputs (cotton, polyester, accessories, dyes and chemicals) for 
traditionally produced Rwandan textiles were not locally sourced and there was a 
                                                        
21 Interview, UTEXRWA, August 2016 
22 Interview, UTEXRWA, August 2016 
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growing market for such products in the United States and Europe, silk could 
contribute to reducing the trade deficit. UTEXRWA officials claim they invested 
more than a million dollars in machinery. The government was hopeful, initially 
characterizing UTEXRWA as an “anchor firm” in the silk value-chain, with a 
“remarkably modernized facility as a production entity” (MINICOM 2009, 78). At the 
time, UTEXRWA employed 650 workers and boasted processing functions from 
spinning, weaving, printing to garment-making. It also had over 5,000 spinning 
spindles and a capacity of one million kg of yarn per annum. By 2009, it had launched 
its production line for silk products and established the brand name – Silk Hills – to 
sell products. UTEXRWA was also looking at developing other backward linkages, 
beginning research on producing natural fiber textiles (from banana and pineapple). 
By 2011, UTEXRWA had only received four tons of cocoons over three years. Since 
the company needed 7.5 tons of cocoons per month to sustain production capacity, 
UTEXRWA officials argued that they stopped investments.23 As of 2016, the 
government had made progress in organizing farmers into 40 cooperatives and 
establishing sericulture centres in four provinces. However, raw materials were still 
insufficient to run a factory. In 2016, UTEXRWA’s silk production was not in 
operation and it had rented out its warehouses to private businesses. Though capacity 
utilization in the factory has not been more than 40 per cent since independence, this 
has dropped to 20 per cent in 2016. 
UTEXRWA officials complained that instead of supporting its investments, the 
Ministry of Defence started a rival company “when they were supposed to be our 
partners. The government should have supported us but they became a competitor.”24 
The military was briefly involved in the sector through its company, Agro-Processing 
Industries (API).25 However, it has now exited the sector. Instead, the government has 
recently begun speaking to new investors including receiving an initial commitment 
from Korean investors – HeWorks Rwanda Silk Ltd. – to invest over five million 
dollars in the silk sector, with an agreement to buy all silk cocoons produced in the 
country and processing them into finished products.  
                                                        
23 Interview, UTEXRWA, January 2015. 
24 Interview, UTEXRWA, August 2016. 
25 Agro-Processing Industries has now been renamed Agro Processing Trust Corporation Ltd. 
(APTC). The Ministry of Defence still has full ownership of the company. APTC has three 
subsidiaries: Agro-Processing Industries Ltd., Rugari Meat Processing and Nyanza Milk 
Industries. 
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New Entrants: Opportunities and Challenges 
 In 2014, Chinese investors – C&H Garments – signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the Rwandan government, agreeing to invest six million dollars to 
begin garment production in Rwanda. Helen Hai and Candy Ma, the owners of C&H 
Garments, had already established factories in Ethiopia, Lesotho and Kenya. 
Managers said they invested in the Rwandan market because of the country’s 
leadership and the incentives that were on offer. C&H was one of the very companies 
in Rwanda to be given Export Processing Zone (EPZ) status since it committed to 
export 80 per cent of its products. Seventy per cent of C&H production is currently 
uniforms, which it exports to China and the United States. It has also begun exporting 
garments for the European and American markets, with some products also exported 
through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Trials are underway for 
producing embroidered table cloths for foreign markets. It received several incentives 
including tax exemptions, duty exemptions on imports. The government also invested 
in constructing the company’s factory in the SEZ. The government, through funding 
from the African Development Bank (AfDB), has funded a large share of the training 
for workers to be employed in C&H’s factories. In September 2016, 400 workers had 
already finished training while a further 500 were being trained. C&H’s planned 
expansion from 900 employees in 2016 to 3,000 employees by 2018 will depend on 
expansion of its factory and the completion of Phase 2 of Kigali’s SEZ. C&H 
managers said they were still worried about the high transport costs and the lack of 
availability of inputs. However, they were positive about the growth of their factory 
and said they had plans to invest in a textile factory by 2018.26 MINICOM officials 
considered C&H investments to be “worth the incentives” and they hoped that this 
would be a “demonstration to attract other Chinese investors as they relocate their 
manufacturing to Africa.”27 
 The government has also supported the establishment of Kigali Garments 
Centre (KGC) – a company with over 400 shareholders. KGC will begin by training 
over 1200 workers at a new plant this year. This effort is a way to formalize Channel 
3, which includes a share of how garments are channeled through Rwanda. Recently, 
Albert Supplies Ltd. has also invested in the sector. There is disagreement about the 
                                                        
26 Interview, C&H Garments, August 2016. 
27 Interviews, MINICOM, August 2016. 
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origin of the company, with some arguing that the company is Guangzhou-based 
(Gahigi 2016) and the government claiming that it is a local company. Albert 
Nsengiyumva, the director of the company, has committed to investing over 12 
million dollars and beginning production next year. These investments are part of the 
establishment of the Apparel Manufacturing Zone (AMZ), with Burundian-based 
Rwantan also agreeing to a deal to set up a shoe factory in the zone (Kuteesa 2016). 
Other leather factories already operate in Rwanda including a Kate Spade ‘On 
Purpose’ project, which employs 173 employees to produce leather bags. Every 
quarter, the company has been exporting 6000 bags through AGOA from Rwanda. 
AGOA presents a substantial opportunity to new investors in the sector, with existing 
textile companies claiming to be unaware of its existence and potential in recent years 
(MINICOM 2016) although UTEXRWA had been exporting through AGOA in the 
2000s. Rwanda only received 1.76 million dollars through AGOA exports between 
2011 and 2013.  
 A significant factor, which has bolstered new investments in the apparels 
sector, has been the increase of duties on second-hand clothing imported in Rwanda. 
In an EAC Heads of State meeting held in early 2016, East African leaders held 
discussions about banning the import of second hand clothing and shoes (Brooks 
2016). Though this plan may only eventually be rolled out in 2019 if the EAC can 
agree to a common industrialization policy, some countries including Rwanda began 
to impose increased duties on second-hand clothes and shoes. Rwanda has already 
spent more than 15 million dollars on importing second-hold clothes. Figures 6 and 7 
demonstrate the evolution of the value of textile imports over time. Though the share 
of textiles and garments as a share of GDP has varied, the value of imported textiles 
has increased significantly since 2009. 
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In June 2016, to support the DMRS, the Rwandan government increased 
duties on the import of used clothes from $0.2/kg to $2.5/kg. Duties were also 
imposed on used shoes from $0.5/kg to $5/kg. Though there is no doubt that such 
policies have acted as a filip to new investments in the apparels sector, it is likely that 
prices will increase in the short-term and local newspapers are already warning of 
such outcomes (Mugabo 2016, Esiara 2016) The government also worries that cartels, 
which import second-hand clothes and operate in the sector, will find ways to by-pass 
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Figure 6: Evolution of Value of Textile Imports: 1995-2014
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Figure 7: Evolution of value of garments imports: 1995-2014
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the rule.28 MINICOM estimates that reforms will not only help recapture the domestic 
market (with a 37 per cent decline in imports of apparels) but will also contribute to 
increasing apparel exports by 17 million dollars.29  
The transformation of the apparels sector in Rwanda has demonstrated several 
characteristics about the nature of the challenge of import substitution in the 21st 
century. Firstly, import substitution has only occurred through active state 
intervention. This has taken the form of the government seeking investors and 
providing tax incentives, imposing increased duties to encourage import substitution 
and developing several policies to guide industrialization. Second, the government has 
had to negotiate the dual challenge of protecting its domestic market while seeking to 
abide by EAC rules and accessing large markets. Third, the government has had to 
find ways to build reciprocal control mechanisms with capitalist partners. However, 
there is very little evidence to demonstrate that such relationships will be sustained if 
exemptions are withdrawn. Additionally, the government exhibited a lack of trust in 
UTEXRWA who government officials argue “was more concerned with businesses in 
Uganda” and “was not serious about doing anything” in Rwanda.30 The reasons may 
be political as foreign investors claim that “the government has no interest in 
supporting foreigners unless there is no other option” and because UTEXRWA was 
closely associated with the Habyarimana regime.31 There are serious concerns in the 
sector with few local partners in place to acquire technological capabilities as the 
country attempts to sustain industrialization going forward. 
 
Tentative Recapturing: The Revitalisation of CIMERWA amidst trade 
liberalization 
 
 Amsden (1989) compared the differences between industrial policies in light 
and heavy industries in Korea. Similar to this study, she chose to focus on textiles as a 
light industry and cement-making as a heavy industry. She found that learning in the 
textiles industry did not spur further industrialization while two chaebols, including 
Hyundai, gained from the diffusion of managerial capabilities within their 
                                                        
28 Interview, MINICOM, August 2016. 
29 Internal government report. 
30 Interviews, MINICOM, August 2016. 
31 Insert, business owner, August 2016. 
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conglomerates. Despite the central place cement production has occupied in the 
industrial histories of many late developers, it has been relatively marginal to African 
industrial histories. In 2011, Africa’s share of global cement production was five 
percent and production was dominated by multinationals – LaFarge, Holcim, 
Heidelberg Cement and Italcemento (Oqubay 2015). In recent years, Nigeria’s Aliko 
Dangote began Dangote cement, which has established a presence in several countries 
around the continent. Dangote’s ventures in cement began as a cement importer. He 
then worked closely with Nigerian President Obasanjo and took advantage of the 
government’s Backward Integration Policy (BIP) to become the leading domestic 
cement producer and contributed significantly to reducing the country’s trade deficit 
(Akinyoade and Uche 2016). Despite the Rwandan government owning shares in the 
largest domestic cement production company, the presence of a foreign investor as a 
majority owner reduces the potential for creating a national champion. The nationality 
of the leading actor in the sector alters the dynamics of power and bargaining required 
to sustain reciprocal control mechanisms. This section demonstrates that it has been 
difficult to build reciprocal control mechanisms not only with the new foreign 
investor-led company but also when the company was owned by an informal 
investment group closely linked to the party – Rwanda Investment Group (RIG).  
The History of Cement Production in Rwanda 
 In the 1970s, limestone, quartz and clay deposits were discovered at a hot 
spring in Bugarama in the Rusizi district. In July 1976, an agreement was struck 
between the Rwandan government and the Chinese government to establish a joint 
venture to construct a cement production plant. As part of the agreement, the Chinese 
government offered a 30-year 13 million dollar interest-free loan (Gathani and 
Stoelinga 2013). In 1984, the CIMERWA plant was commissioned. CBMC, a 
Chinese company, managed the plant under a “Build, own, operate and transfer” 
agreement. Initially, the plant had a capacity of 50,000 tons per year. Though 
production stopped during the war and genocide in the 1990s, the Chinese company 
returned after the genocide.  In 2001, the plant was expanded and production capacity 
was increased to 100,000 tons per year. In 2006, the Chinese loan expired and the 
government chose to privatize the company. An informal investment group – RIG – 
took control of 90 per cent of CIMERWA. However, “RIG didn’t really do much. 
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They said they would invest as per the privatization agreement but they failed.”32 RIG 
even made some investments to build a new plant. One of the reasons for the lack of 
activity was that a leading investor in RIG, Tribert Rujugiro, left Rwanda because of 
tax evasion and money laundering charges in the United Kingdom. He later fell out 
with the President Kagame. Later, his Rwandan properties and businesses were 
ceased (Behuria 2015). 
 CIMERWA remained “in a bad situation since the plant was old and 
maintenance costs were high.”33 In 2010, the AfDB approved a 130 million dollar 
loan to CIMERWA to construct a new plant (Gathani and Stoelinga 2013). However, 
CIMERWA struggled to find additional funding. In 2011, some state-owned 
institutions and local actors also reinvested in CIMERWA. Under the new ownership 
structure, the Rwanda Social Security Board (RSSB) held 37.5 per cent of shares, the 
government held 30.7 per cent of shares, the Rwanda Development Bank (BRD) held 
8.5 per cent of shares, RIG held 21.2 per cent of shares, SONARWA (a local 
insurance firm) held 1.4 per cent of shares and the remaining shares were owned by 
two local businessmen (Paul Mubiligi and Eugene Nyagahene). In January 2013, 
South Africa’s largest cement producer – PPC Ltd. – invested 69 million dollars to 
assume majority (51 per cent) control of CIMERWA. PPC was enticed to invest in 
Rwanda because of the “investment policies, business climate and tax rebates.”34 One 
of their most significant worries was the availability and price of power. The 
remaining shares were retained by RSSB (20.24 per cent), the government (16.55 per 
cent), RIG (11.45 per cent) and SONARWA (0.76 per cent). Since PPC assumed 
majority ownership, CIMERWA has invested 170 million dollars in a new modern 
dry process production plant with a capacity of 600,000 tons of cement per year. 
 In 1999, Kigali Cement Company (KCC) was established by a local investor, 
Jean Damascene Ndayambaje (Gathani and Sotelinga 2013). Unlike CIMERWA, 
which is a full manufacturing process plant in Rwanda and produces its own clinker, 
KCC imports clinker. Between 2007 and 2011, KCC imported clinker from Athi 
River Mining Ltd., which was the largest cement manufacturer in East Africa 
(Gathani and Stoelinga 2013). In 2011, ARM acquired 35 per cent of KCC and by 
                                                        
32 Interview, CIMERWA employee, August 2016. 
33 Interview, CIMERWA employee, August 2016. 
34 Interview, CIMERWA employee, August 2016. 
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2014, ACC had full ownership of KCC. KCC was a relatively small company, 
producing about 100-120 tons per day. 
Matching construction growth: State intervention versus trade liberalization and the 
power of importers 
 Figure 8 illustrates the rapid increase in cement imports, beginning in 2006. 
This was largely due to the “construction boom” that began in this period in the 
country, especially focused in and around Kigali (Goodfellow 2014). During this 
period, RIG’s limited production was unable to keep up with the demands for cement. 
As a result, several new Ugandan, Tanzanian and Kenyan importers entered the 
country. Uganda’s Tororo cement was a significant player in the late 2000s until it fell 
foul of the East African Gazette Law when it was discovered that the company was 
importing clinker from outside the EAC.35 Since then, other importers including 
Uganda’s Hima Cement and Tanzania’s Simba Cement have begun to dominate the 
market. Smaller regional players like Bamburi, Savannah, Twiga and Nyati are also 
operating as importers. One cement dealer said, “when new cement dealers come in, 
they reduce the price. However, eventually, they also put their prices up.”36 
Tanzania’s Kilimanjaro Cement also gained a large market share in 2014. One cement 
dealer highlighted that “Kilimanjaro was really booming when they came in. They 
were aggressive and established many outlets.”37 However, in 2015, Rwanda delisted 
Kilimanjaro from preferential treatment after government officials alleged that 
Kilimanjaro was importing cement from Pakistan and repackaging it in local bags 
(Esiara 2015). Though import substitution in the cement sector is clearly inhibited by 
adhering to EAC trade agreements, the Rwandan government strategically uses the 
East African Gazette Law to ensure foreign importers are also abiding by the rules. 
  
                                                        
35 Interview, cement importer, August 2016. 
36 Interview, local cement dealer, August 2016. 
37 Interview, local cement dealer, August 2016. 
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Source: MINICOM 
 
 Until 2015, CIMERWA and KCC’s production fell short of domestic demands 
for cement. KCC was a comparatively small player and remains “happy with its small 
share of the market and established customers.”38 However, currently, total 
production capacity in Rwanda is 600,000 tons a year, which should outweigh 
domestic demand (which some estimate to be between 400,000-450,000 tons a year). 
CIMERWA and KCC should both reach full production capacity by 2018. 
CIMERWA has already previously exported small shares of its production to the 
DRC and Burundi. However, increasing production capacity was one part of the 
challenge of recapturing the domestic market. Initially, CIMERWA did not enjoy the 
logistical advantages enjoyed by importers. Comparatively, Hima and Simba had 
established markets and brands in the country. CIMERWA’s cement was also 
comparatively more expensive than that of importers. For example, in 2015, a 50kg 
cement bag of CIMERWA cement was 2000Rwf more expensive than that of Hima 
cement. However, in 2016, the gap between CIMERWA’s cement and imported 
cement had reduced. Rwandan-produced cement had much higher costs because of 
energy costs and transport costs (given that gypsum and fuel oil were still imported). 
Since Hima and Simba did not have to pay duties, the Rwandan government could not 
provide locally-produced cement with any protection against them. Local cement 
dealers also argued that they continued to buy imported cement not just because of the 
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price but because they trusted quality.39 However, CIMERWA worked with ‘Made in 
Rwanda’ campaigns to persuade local consumers of the comparatively better quality 
of its cement.40 CIMERWA officials complained that the government could still do 
more to ensure local consumers bought locally-produced cement (including in 
government projects). One cement dealer said, “in some tenders, CIMERWA is the 
specified dealer to be used but only sometimes. They never specify one of the 
importers.”41 For example, both Hima and Simba cement was used in the recently 
completed Kigali Convention Centre project.  
 
 “The government is the one that can help. It should do more through tenders 
and ensure that companies buy local cement. Leadership has to understand that if 
anything happens to CIMERWA, industrialization will fail. It can even do more to 
protect its local companies. DRC, Uganda and Cameroon all stopped imports before. 
CIMERWA has a loan, which we will start paying in February and it expires in seven 
years. If we don’t get enough government support, we might default in the loan.”42 
 
 Though CIMERWA has increased its production capacity, most of its 
production is concentrated in Pozzolanic Portland Cement (PPC) 32.5N although it 
also produces some 42.5N cement. The two products are composed of different raw 
materials and are used in different kinds of construction projects. Another form of 
cement, 52.5N cement, is not yet sold in the Rwandan market. However, there is some 
demand for it. Importers like Simba also supply Ordinary Portland Cement (OPC). 
Local cement dealers said that Hima and CIMERWA dominate most of the market in 
32.5N cement. However, Simba dominates most of the market in 42.5N cement and 
Simba employees do not see CIMERWA as a direct competitor. Importers 
interviewed agreed that it would be right for CIMERWA to dominate the market and 
that they had been impressed with how the company had captured market share to “up 
to about 50 per cent from having just 15 per cent a few years before.”43 
 Clearly, there has been significant progress in import substitution in the 
Rwandan cement sector. This has occurred through heavy state intervention with the 
government seeking new investors, providing benefits for CIMERWA and assisting 
                                                        
39 Interview, local cement dealer, August 2016. 
40 Interview, CIMERWA, August 2016. 
41 Interview, local cement dealer, August 2016. 
42 Interview, CIMERWA, August 2016. 
43 Interviews, cement importers, August 2016. 
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them in guaranteeing sales through some tenders and marketing campaigns.44 
However, the sustainability of the reciprocal control mechanism with CIMERWA is 
limited by the government’s capacity to manage the demands of the foreign investors 
while adhering to EAC demands. It lacks the power it would have enjoyed if it had 
partnered with a domestic investor but it lost the opportunity for such a collaboration 
because of political reasons, with RIG’s former leading investor (Rujugiro) now 
working with opponents of the government abroad. 
 
Conclusion: The Challenge of Import Substitution in the 21st Century 
 
 Late development is always a challenging, unstable process. Initiating ISI had 
always been fundamentally a political process despite the technical challenges 
associated with it. In the 21st century, especially for a small, land-locked country like 
Rwanda with a limited market size, the political and technical challenges associated 
with ISI have been exacerbated. Given that ISI has been initiated after two decades of 
liberalization, the degree of state intervention required has been significant. However, 
the form of state intervention has been reactive, rather than a product of an established 
plan. It has had to counter challenges pertaining to abiding by regional trade rules and 
negotiating the power of importers while also finding ways to establish capacity to 
acquire technological capabilities and sustain reciprocal control mechanisms.  
 This paper has examined the challenge of developing a reactive strategy of 
import substitution in the 21st century after two decades of liberalization and market-
led policies. Given that the Rwandan government has revised its strategy, its progress 
has been quite impressive. However, that has largely been down to the active role of 
the state in reversing some of its past market-led reforms. This paper argues that the 
Rwandan government has attempted to develop such policies through very active state 
intervention in the form of ‘picking winners.’ However, unlike existing literature on 
Rwanda’s developmental patrimonialism, the paper demonstrates how state 
intervention has taken the form of picking foreign investors as ‘winners’, rather than 
party- or military-owned enterprises. Given the nature of “late late late development”, 
as Hirschman (1968) would call it, a reliance on foreign investors should not be 
surprising. Clearly, like most other African countries, it shows that the Rwandan 
                                                        
44 Interview, CIMERWA and MINICOM, August 2016. 
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government has been unable to develop a national capitalist class (Whitfield et al. 
2015). However, it also shows that late development in the 21st century must occur 
while relying on foreign investors. This reliance is particularly unstable given that 
there are limited domestic capitalists who can absorb the technological acquisition 
that may be acquired from engagement with foreign investors.  
 Most importantly, this paper examines how reciprocal control mechanisms are 
built while negotiating the trade-offs associated with trade integration – where access 
to larger markets are often associated with limiting the use of industrial policy 
instruments. For Rwanda, legal restrictions on policy space from the WTO are less 
important when compared to the needs to abide by regional trade treaties (the EAC) 
and deal with pressure from donors. In the Rwandan case, increasingly free regional 
markets may prove to be costly in the short-term and only aggressive state 
interventionism can ensure that Rwandan-based companies can become regional 
champions, which acquire technological capabilities. For reciprocal control 
mechanisms with such champions to be sustained, the government must retain the 
capacity to discipline foreign investors. It must also be capable of monitoring such 
enterprises while nurturing domestic capitalists to be in place to absorb technologies 
and step in when the time is right. 
  
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY: 
 
Aggarwal, A. 2006. Special Economic Zones: Revisiting the Policy Debate. Economic 
and Political Weekly 41 (43/44): 4533-4536. 
Akinyoade, A. and C. Uche. 2016. Dangote Cement: An African Success Story? ASC 
Working Paper No. 131. 
Amsden, A. 1989.  Asia’s next giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Amsden, A. 2001. The Rise of ‘The Rest’: Challenges to the West from Late- 
Industrializing Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Amsden, A. 2007. Escape from Empire: The Developing World’s Journey through 
Heaven and Hell. Bston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. 
Amsden, A. 2013. Securing the home market: A new approach to Korean 
development. UNRISD Working Paper 2013-1. Geneva. 
Amsden, A. and T. Hikino. 2000. The bark is worse than the bite: new WTO law and 
late industrialization. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 570 (1): 104-114. 
Balassa, B. 1982. Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Bauer, P.T. 1981. Dissent on Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
34 
 
Behuria, P. 2015. Between party capitalism and market reforms – understanding 
sector differences in Rwanda. The Journal of Modern African Studies 53 (3): 415-450. 
Behuria, P. 2016. Centralising rents and dispersing power while pursuing 
development? Exploring the strategic uses of military firms in Rwanda. Review of 
African Political Economy 43 (150): 603-647. 
Behuria, P. and T. Goodfellow. 2016. The Political Settlement and ‘Deals 
Environment’ in Rwanda: Unpacking two decades of economic growth. Effective 
States and Inclusive Development Research Centre Working Paper No. 57. 
Bernstein, H. and L. Campling. 2006. Commodity Studies and Commodity Fetishism 
I: Trading Down. Journal of Agrarian Change 6 (2): 239-264. 
Bienen, H. 1990. The Politics of Trade Liberalization in Africa. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change 38 (4): 713-733. 
Boone, C. 1994. Trade, Taxes, and Tribute: Market Liberalizations and the new 
importers in West Africa. World Development 22 (3): 453-467. 
Booth, D. and F. Golooba-Mutebi. 2012. Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of 
Rwanda. African Affairs 111 (444): 379-403. 
Bruton, H. 1998. A Reconsideration of Import Substitution. Journal of Economic 
Literature 36 (2): 903-936. 
Chandra, V., Y. Li and I. Osorio. 2007. Commodity Export Discovery in Rwanda – 
Many export discoveries with little scaling-up. World Bank Report No. 37860-RW. 
Chang, H-J. 2002. Kicking away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical 
Perspective. Anthem Press. 
Chang, H-J. 2010. 23 Things they don’t tell you about Capitalism. London: Penguin. 
Chang, H-J. 2013. Industrial Policy: Can Africa Do It? In: J. Stiglitz, J. Lin and E. 
Patel, eds. The Industrial Policy Revolution II: Africa in the 21st Century. Palgrave 
Macmillan: 114-134. 
Cramer, C. 1999. Can Africa Industrialize by Processing Primary Commodities? The 
Case of Mozambican Cashew Nuts. World Development 27 (7): 1247-1266. 
Esiara, K. 2015. Rwanda delists Kilimanjaro cement from preferential treatment. The 
East African. 31 October. 
Esiara, K. 2016. Outcry in Rwanda as govt increases tax on second hand clothes, 
shoes. The East African. 11 June. 
Evans, P. 2014. The Developmental State: Divergent Responses to Modern Economic 
Theory and the Twenty-First-Century Economy. In: Michelle Williams, ed. The End 
of the Developmental State. London: Routledge: 220-240. 
Ewing, A. 1964. Industrialization and the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 2 (3): 351-363. 
Farole, T. 2011. Special Economic Zones in Africa: Comparing performance and 
learning from global experiences. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Frank, A.G. 1966. The Development of Underdevelopment. Monthly Review 18 (4): 
17-31. 
Gahigi, M. 2016. New textile firms enter Rwanda. The East African. 10 September. 
Gathani, S. and D. Stoelinga. 2013. Understanding Rwanda’s Agribusiness and 
Manufacturing sectors. London: International Growth Centre. 
Gereffi, G. 1999. International trade and industrial upgrading in the apparel 
commodity chain. Journal of International Economics 48 (1): 37-70. 
Gereffi, G. and S. Frederick. 2010. The global apparel value chain, trade and the 
crisis: challenges and opportunities for developing countries. World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper Series No. 5821. USAID Employment and Enterprise 
Development Division Working Paper No. 24. 
35 
 
Gerschenkron, A. 1962. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book 
of Essays. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. 
Goodfellow, T. 2014. Rwanda’s Political Settlement and the Urban Transition: 
Expropriation, construction and taxation in Kigali. Journal of Eastern African Studies 
8 (2): 311-329. 
Government of Rwanda (GoR). 2000. Rwanda Vision 2020. Kigali: Government of 
Rwanda. 
Haggblade, S. 1989. A Review of Rwanda’s Textile Clothing Subsector.  
Hirschman, A.O. 1958. The Strategy for Economics Development. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Hirschman, A.O. 1968. The Political Economy of Import-substituting 
Industrialization in Latin America. The Quarterly Journal of economics 82 (1): 1-32. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2016. Rwanda: Fifth review under the policy 
support instrument and request for extension, and request for an arrangement under 
the Standby Credit Facility. IMF Country Report No. 16/153. Washington, DC: 
International Monetary Fund. 
Jomo, K.S. and R. Von Arnim. 2011. Economic Liberalization and Constraints to 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. In: A. Noman, K. Botchwey, H. Stein and J. 
Stiglitz, eds. Good Governance and Growth in Africa: Rethinking Development 
Strategies. Oxford University Press: 499-535. 
Kaplinsky, R. 2006. Revisiting the revisited terms of trade: Will China make a 
difference? World Development 34 (6): 981-995. 
Kanamugire, J. and J-P. Afadhali. 2016. Positivo now produces computers in 
Rwanda. The East African. 14 May. 
Kelsall, T. 2013. Business, Politics and the State in Africa: Challenging the 
orthodoxies on growth and transformation. Zed Books. 
Khan, M. 2000. Rents, Efficiency and Growth. In: M. Khan and K.S. Jomo, eds. 
Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 21-69. 
Khan, S.R. 2007. WTO, IMF and the closing of development policy space for low-
income countries: a call for neo-developmentalism. Third World Quarterly 28 (6): 
1073-1090. 
Krueger, A. 1974. The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. American 
Economic Review 64 (3): 291-303. 
Krueger, A. 1985. Import substitution versus export promotion. Finance and 
Development 22 (2): 20-23. 
Kuteesa, H. 2016. New textile investors enter local market. 8 September. 
Lal, D. 1985. The Poverty of Development Economics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Lall, S. 1995. Structural Adjustment and African Industry. World Development 23 
(12): 2019-2031. 
Lewis, W.A. 1954. Economic Development with unlimited supplies of labour. 
Manchester School 22 (2): 139-191. 
Lin, J. 2012. New Structural Economics: A Framework for Rethinking Development 
and Policy. World Bank. 
List, F. 1928. The National System of Political Economy. London: Longmans, Green 
& Co. 
Lockwood, W. The Economic Development of Japan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
36 
 
Love, J. 1980. Raul Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange. 
Latin American Research Review 15 (3): 45-72. 
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN). Economic Development 
and Poverty Reduction Strategy: 2013-2018. Kigali: Government of Rwanda. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM). 2009. Rwanda Industrial Master Plan. 
Kigali: Government of Rwanda. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM). 2010a. Rwanda Trade Policy. Kigali: 
Government of Rwanda. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM). 2010b. Rwanda Special Economic Zone 
Policy. Kigali: Government of Rwanda. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM). 2011. National Industrial Policy. 
Kigali: Government of Rwanda. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM). 2015. Domestic Market Recapturing 
Strategy. Kigali: Government of Rwanda. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM). 2016. National Export Strategy II. 
Kigali: Government of Rwanda. 
Mkandawire, T. and C. Soludo. 1998. Our Continent, Our Future: African 
perspectives on Structural Adjustment. CODESRIA. 
Mugabo, J. 2016. Low-income earners worried over ban on second-hand clothes. 
Rwanda Focus. 27 April. 
Mugomba, A. 1978. Regional Organisations and African Underdevelopment: The 
Collapse of the East African Community. The Journal of Modern African Studies 16 
(2): 261-272. 
Mukaaya, E. 2007. UTEXRWA to spur economic development. The New Times. 9 
December. 
Ndoli, F. 2011. UTEXRWA directed to reinstate employees. The New Times. 19 
February. 
Norman, H.E. 1940. Japan’s Emergence as a Modern State: Political and Economic 
problems of the Meiji period. University of British Columbia Press. 
Ocampo, J-A. and L. Taylor. 1998. Trade Liberalisation in Developing Economies: 
Modest benefits but problems with productivity growth, macro prices and income 
distribution. The Economic Journal 108 (450): 1523-1546. 
Oqubay, A. 2015. Made in Africa: Industrial Policy in Ethiopia. Oxford University 
Press. 
Page, J. 2012. Can Africa Industrialize? Journal of African Economies 21 (2): ii86-
ii124. 
Prebisch, R. 1950. The Economic Development of Latin America and its principal 
problems. New York: United Nations Department of Social Affairs. 
Ravenhill, J. 1979. Regional integration and development in Africa: Lessons from the 
East African Community. Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 17 (3): 
227-246. 
Reinert, E. 2007. How rich countries got rich… and why poor countries stay poor. 
London: Constable. 
Rodrik, D. 2008. Normalizing Industrial Policy. World Bank.  
Rodrik, D. 2016. Premature deindustrialization. Journal of Economic Growth 21 (1): 
1-33. 
Rosenstein-Rodan, P.N. 1943. Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and Sotuh-
Eastern Europe. The Economic Journal 53 (210): 202-211. 
Rostow, W. 1960. The Stages for Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
37 
 
Sarkar, P. and H. Singer. 1991. Manufactured exports of developing countries and 
their terms of trade since 1965. World Development 19 (4): 333-340. 
Schmitz, H. 1984. Industrialization strategies in less developed countries: Some 
lessons of historical experience. The Journal of Development Studies 21 (1): 1-21.  
Shadlen, K. 2005. Exchanging development for market access? Deep integration and 
industrial policy under multilateral and regional-bilateral trade agreements. Review of 
International Political Economy 12 (5): 750-775. 
Singer, H. 1950. The distribution of gains between investing and borrowing countries. 
American Economic Review 40: 478-496. 
Smith, A. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
Oxford University Press. 
Smith, A. 2015. The state, institutional frameworks and the dynamics of capital in 
global production networks. Progress in Human Geography 39 (3): 290-315. 
Stein, H. 1992. Deindustrialization, adjustment, the World Bank and the IMF in 
Africa. World Development 20 (1): 83-95. 
Stein, H. 2012. Africa, Industrial Policy and Export Processing Zones: Lessons from 
Asia. In: A. Noman, K. Botchwey, H. Stein and J. Stiglitz, eds. Good Governance and 
Growth in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies. Oxford University Press: 322-
344. 
Thrasher, R. and K. Gallagher. 2008. 21st Century Trade Agreements: Implications for 
Long-Run Development Policy. The Pardee Papers, No. 2, Frederick S. Pardee Center 
for the Studey of the Longer-Range Future, Boston University. 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). 2016. Country Profile 
2015 – Rwanda. Addis Ababa: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 
Verwimp, P. 2003. The Political Economy of Coffee, Dictatorship and Genocide. 
European Journal of Political Economy 19 (2): 161-181. 
Wade, R. 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the role of government 
in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Wade, R. 2003. What strategies are viable for developing countries today? The World 
Trade Organization and the shrinking of ‘development space’. Review of International 
Political Economy 10 (4): 621-644. 
Waterbury, J. 1999. The Long Gestation and Brief Triumph of Import-Substituting 
Industrialization. World Development 27 (2): 323-341. 
Weiss, L. 2005. Gloval governance, national strategies: how industrialized states 
make room to move under the WTO. Review of International Political Economy 12 
(50: 723-749. 
World Bank. 1997. The State in a Changing World. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
Zangrandi, M.S. and M. Mogollon. 2015. Rwanda’s New Companies: An Overview 
of Registrations, Taxes, Employments and Exports. World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 7527. 
Zhou, Y. 2008. Synchronizing Export Orientation with Import Substitution: Creating 
Competitive Indigenous High-Tech Companies in China. 
